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Abstract 
This paper analyzes the provision of discrete public goods when 
individuals have altruistic preferences 'l<hich others do not precisely know. 
The problem is formulated and solved as a Bayesian game. In contrast to 
standard social psychological approaches , based on such natural language terms 
as greed, fear , and trust, the Bayesian approach provides a rigorous 
mathematical treatment of social participation. This theory is shown to make 
strong testable predictions that can integrate data collected across a wide 
variety of natural and experimental settings. The al truism model is shown to 
be supported by existing experimental data on binary voluntary contribution 
games. 
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Private Incentives in Social Dilemmas 
I. Introduction 
Thomas R. Palfrey 
Howard Rosenthal 
Carnegie-Mellon University 
Participation or contribution often generates collective benefits that 
exceed collective costs. On the other hand, an individual's own benefit from 
contributing may well depend upon other individuals' contribution choices. 
One particular version of this problem specifies a threshold level of 
contribution required for the generation of these collective benefits, and can 
be thought of as the provision of a discrete public good. This type of 
problem has been termed a "social dilemma" (Dawes, 1980). Key questions in 
the analysis of social dilemmas include: (1) How can incentives to make 
voluntary contributions be structured to achieve "better" allocations of 
public goods? (2) Is there a model which can be used to accurately predict or 
explain behavior under a broad variety of incentive structures without 
requiring a separate assumption to explain behavior under each variation in 
incentives? These two questions, one normative and the other positive, remain 
largely unanswered. 
The development of theoretical models 1 that address these questions has 
been stimulated in recent years by the rapid accumulation of a large body of 
data from laboratory experiments on the voluntary provision of public goods. 2 
While these experiments may differ dramatically from one another in their 
incentive structures, they all ' attempt to induce preferences by providing 
monetary payoffs. What we argue here is that key aspects of preference are 
1 
not controlled for in these experiments despite the strong monetary 
inducements. 3 We offer a solution to this problem by formally modelling the 
effects of imperfectly controlled preferences in social dilemma experiments. 
The aspect of uncontrolled preferences we focus upon involves utility 
derived directly from acts of social cooperation or contribution, the utility 
of altruism or social duty. The concept of altruism may be given an 
operational definition in a variety of ways. Among economists [e. g. , Roberts 
(1984)] , altruism is often specified in terms of an individual utility 
function that depends upon the consumption levels or utility functions of 
other individuals. In our public goods context, we define altruism in a 
different but related way. Altruism is defined here as an additive component 
of utility that depends solely on how much the individual contributes. 
We wish to emphasize that the interesting results of our model are rot a 
trivial consequence of the fact that individuals may "like to cont�ibute, " To 
"explain" the data by saying that people contribute only because it is fun to 
do so would be uninteresting. What matters in a social dilemma is the 
uncertainty each individual has about how many others in the group will 
contribute. We choose to model this uncertainty as ooriving from privately 
known altruistic preferences. This is a matter of convenience as much as 
anything else. Many alternative specifications are conceivable all of which 
involve introducing some privately known components to complement the 
experimentally induced monetary rewards. These alternatives include risk 
preferences and general non-monetary utility payoffs as a function of how many 
other individuals are contributing, "'1tich could be interpreted as either 
"income effects" or "conditional altruism". Some of these alternatives are 
discussed in more detail at the end of the paper. One compelling reason for 
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choosing to model altruism as the unknown component is that there is 
widespread belief, supported by more than casual experimental evidence, that 
individuals in these experiments behave altruistically, at least in the sense 
we intend it: that the "real" cost to participants of making a contribution 
is significantly less than the direct monetary cost imposed by the rules of 
the experiment. 
We thus present a model of social dilemmas as games in which all monetary 
incentives are common knowledge but in 'l>ttich altruism is private information. 
All individuals are the same a priori, in the sense that the private non-
monetary components of preferences are assumed to be drawn from a distribution 
that is identical for all individuals (and common knowledge) . The resulting 
game of incomplete information is analyzed in terms of Bayesian Nash 
equilibrium (Harsanyi, 1967-68) . The equilibrium strategies turn rut to be 
very simple rules of thumb: contribute if one's al truism exceeds some 
threshold level, otherwise do rot contribute. This equilibrium analysis 
produces several simple testable hypotheses, which we confront with data from 
experi!llents conducted by others in recent published research. A central 
prediction of the model is that contribution rates should be inversely related 
to the equilibrium cutpoint, Using data from various social dilemma 
experiments, we test 'l>ttether this inverse relationship holds. ltlreover, this 
inverse relationship is predicted to hold across different payoff structures 
and so we are able to utilize data produced from a variety of apparently 
different experimental environments. 
We feel that testing the empirical implications of the Bayesian 
equilibrium model is particularly important in light of the considerable 
experimental evidence that has been accumulated recently which indicates that 
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individual behavior under uncertainty is rot always consistent with the 
maximization of expected utility and which indicates that individuals do not 
always make statistical inferences consistent with Bayes' rule5 · In contrast 
to these negative findings, the experimental results reported here indicate 
that our Bayesian equilibrium model fits aggregate behavior reasonably well, 
at least in the social dilemma experiments examined here. 
2. A Two Person Example 
We begin with a simple example to illustrate the basic approach. Two 
individuals, A and B, are independently asked by an " organizer" to contribute 
$c < $1. 00 for a non-exclusive public good which costs exactly $c to produce. 
If at least one of them contributes, the public good will be provided. If 
both happen to contribute, the "organizer" pockets one of the contributions, 
but still produces the good, If no one contributes, the good is not produced. 
The public good has a "money value" of $1 to both A and B. If we assume that 
each of their utility functions is linear in "money value" then the payoff 
matrix4 for the game is given in Figure 1. 
Player A 
Contribute 
Don't 
Contribute 
Player B 
Contribute 
1-c 
Don't 
Contribute 
1 
1-c 1 -c 
1 
1-c 0 
0 
Figure 1. Payoff Matrix 
This game has 2 pure strategy equilibria (exactly one of the players 
4 
contributes) and a mixed strategy equilibrium in which each player contributes 
with probability 1-c. 
In the formulation in which the players each have an additional "altruism" 
component to their utility function, 4\, dB, the payoff matrix is given in 
Figure 2. 
Player 1 
Contribute 
Don't 
Contribute 
Player B 
Contribute 
l+dB-C 
l+dA-c 
l+dB-c 
1 
Don't 
Contribute 
1 
l+dA-c 
0 
0 
Figure 2. Payoff Matrix with Altruistic Preferences. 
Since, we will be assuming that d i is private information to i, the 
natural candidate for a non-cooperative solution ·concept is Bayesian 
equilibrium, and IYe have to specify priors each player has about the other 
player's d value. We will assume that each player has a well-defined prior 
about the other player's d value, that this prior is the same for both players 
and that it can be represented by the distribution function, F(d) ,6 
A symmetric equilibrium to this game is characterized as a strategy or 
decision rule expressed in terms of a "cutpoint" d*, such that individual i 
contributes if di > d*, defects if d i < di', and takes either action if di-d*. 
Equilibrium results if, when both players use d*, neither player can achieve a 
higher expected utility by using an alternative strategy. 
Observe that, if d i > c then player i has a dominant strategy to 
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contribute and, if di < c-1 then player i has a dominant strategy not to 
contribute, Throughout the paper, we refer to such individuals as benevolents 
and malevolents, respectively.7 
The behavior of individuals without dominant strategies will depend upon 
their expectations about the behavior of others as embodied in their knowledge 
of F(d) and the monetary incentive structure specified by the parameter c. 
Define the equilibrium probability that a player contributes as: 
q* - 1 - F(d*) (1)
The equilibrium hypothesis requires that the expected utility of 
contribution must equal the expected utility of defecting, given that the 
other player uses the decision rule d* and therefore contributes with 
probability q*. This generates a second equation, given below: 
1 - c + d* - q* (2) 
An equilibria (q*, d*) is any pair which simultaneously solves (1) and 
(2). For this special example, a unique equilibrium always exists as long as
F is continuous and F( c-1) < 1. In general, existence will not be a 
problem, but uniqueness can be problematic, as is discussed later. 
3. Symmetric Binary Contribution Games 
In this section, we extend the preceeding example of a two person game to 
the analysis of N player contribution games where all players are symmetric 
with respect to monetary payoffs. Each player i has two alternative actions 
denoted Sid 0, 1) where si - 1 denotes contribution and Si - 0 denotes 
non-contribution. As above, we assume that players share a common prior, 
denoted by F(d) . 
In all the experimental public goods environments we analyze, the monetary 
6 
payoff an individual receives depends only on the number of other individuals 
who contribute and on 8i. . Letting mi denote the rumber of individuals other 
than i who choose contribution, we use the notation v(m i• s i) to indicate 
monetary payoffs. Finally , dropping the i subscript for convenience , we use 
contributions to reach the threshold , a public good is provided. 9 The cost of 
contrib11tion is c ,  0 < c < 1. The relevant specifications are included in 
Table 1. 
�j to denote the probability player i assigns to the event mi - j. Table 1 About Here 
For our simple model of altruism in binary contribution games, the total 
utility to a contributor can be written as v(mi, l) +di, and the total utility 
to non-contributors as v(m i, O). Altruism enters additively , and individuals 
are risk neutral with respect to monetary payments. 
At the outpoint d *, the expected utility of contribution 11Ust equal the 
expected utility of non-contribution. We obtain: 
or 
N-1 
L �jvu, 1> + d* 
j-0 
N-1 
- L �jv<J ,o) 
j-0 
N-1 
d* - L 
j-0 
�. [v(j , O) - v(j, l)] 
J (4) 
The probabilities � can all be expressed in terms of q, the probability 
that a randomly selected individual will contribute. In equilibrium, q - q * 
as given by equation (1). Values of q* and d* that simultaneously solve 
equations (1) and (4) represent a symmetric Bayesian Nash equilib_ to the 
game. 8 
Games of particular interest are the specifications of the v( · ) functions 
chosen by Van de Kragt et, al. (1986) and Simm�ns et. al. (1983) in conducting 
a large number of one shot voluntary contributions experiments. Most of their 
games are threshold games, M:iere w is the threshold. If there are sufficient 
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The first game described in the table is a variant of Chicken (Luce and 
Raiffa, 1957). Being "chicken" is equivalent to contributing, as one would 
prefer to receive the monetary benefit of 1 without having to incur the cost 
of contribution, c. In addition, contributions past the threshold are wasted. 
Two adapted versions of this game, called No Fear and No Greed were designed 
by Simmons et. al. (1983) to eliminate some of the disincentives to 
contribution that exist in Chicken. 
In the No Fear game, contributions are refunded if the threshold is not 
met. As an example of No Fear, some corporate tender offers (see Grossman and 
Hart, 1980) have a payoff structure similar to No Fear, The tenderer offers 
to buy all shares offered at a stated price provided some fraction of the 
shares is offered. This price is below the market value the stock would enjoy 
if the tender succeeds but is above the market val�e if the offer fails. Each 
shareholder would prefer to hold his shares, if he or she could be sure that 
enough other stockholders would tender. There are numerous related 
illustrations from the corporate world which involve incentive structures 
similar to these "No Fear" tender offers .1 o 
The No Greed game in fact removes any incentive to hold out to avoid the 
cost of contributing. All players are forced into contributing and receive 
only 1-c M:ienever at least w individuals contribute. But , in contrast to No 
8 
Fear, one can still be "stuck" with the contribution cost of c if the 
threshold isn' t met. 
There are, of course , many other possibilities. One, which we call 
Control, removes both the "greed" and the "fear" disincentives. There are 
both refunds and compulsory contributions. If fewer than w individuals 
contribute , contributions are refunded. If at least w individuals contribute, 
the rest of the individuals are all forced to contribute, Majority voting on 
a head tax is a particular institutional mechanism which is approximated by 
this game. 
The "Poison" game shown in Table 1 is another example of a natural setting 
that can be analyzed in our framework. Poison differs from No Fear only in 
that the tender offer is unconditional. Consequently, contributors always 
receive 1-c even if the threshold is not met, Our labelling this variant 
Poison owes its inspiration to Time' s 1 1  account of the takeover struggle 
between T. Boone Pickens and the management of Unocal. The quantity 1-c 
represents the $S4 per share Pickens was offering for Unocal stock. The 
quantity 1 corresponds to the $72 per share Unocal' s "poison pill" plan ioould 
bestow on remaining stockholders were Pickens to succeed in acquiring a 
majority interest. The quantity 0 represents the relatively low value the 
stock would have (less than $S4) if Pickens' takeover attempt failed. 
The remaining two games in the table represent two actual experiments 
where non-contribution was a dominant strategy in terms of the monetary 
payoffs. In Dominant, a player receives a payoff only if w others contribute. 
The player' s own decision is never critical to the player' s receiving a 
"public" payoff, A player' s contribution only affects whether others receive 
their "public" payoffs. Hence, only benevolent individuals will contribute. 
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In Incremental, every contribution of c bestows a value of b on each of the 
other players. Again, only benevolent individuals have an incentive to 
contribute, For these experiments, equilibrium is trivially characterized by 
d* - c. 
We next apply equation (4) to each of the other games for which 
experimental results exist and for Control, 'Jhe resulting equilibrium 
conditions are: 
d* - c� (N�l) q*k (l-q*)N-1-k 
k-0 
d* - (c-1) [N-l)q*w-1 (1-q*)N-w w-1 
- (N-1) q*w-1 (1-q*)N-w w-1 
(Sa) 
(Chicken) 
(Sb) 
(No Fear) 
(Sc) 
(No Greed) 
(Sd) 
(Control) 
Note that in the Control variant the cut point must be negative. 
Individuals with positive d will always contribute. Failure to observe 100 
per cent contribution in the Control situation would indicate, from the 
perspective of this model , that the subject pool included malevolent 
individuals, 
4. Comparative Statics 
In this section, we present some general comparative statics for the 
equilibria to the binary contribution games represented by equations (Sa-Sd). 
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There are two basic types of comparisons. In the first , we hold constant c ,  
w, N, and F( · ) and compare the equilibria that result when the incentive 
structure is varied, In the second, we look within incentive structures and 
ask how contribution rates and the cutpoint change as either c ,  w, N ,  or F( · ) 
is varied while all other features of the game are held constant. 
Changing the Incentive Structure 
Which incentive structure leads to greater participation? A partial 
answer to this question is available from two facts. (1) The right hand side 
of equation (1) is decreasing in d*. (2) For fixed q*, the right hand side of 
(Sa) is greater than the right hand side of either (Sb) or (Sc). In turn, the 
right hand side of either (Sb) or (Sc) is greater than that of (Sd). These 
two facts imply the following: 
Proposition. 
Fix c , N ,  w and F ( · ) . . 
(1) There exists at least one stable equilibrium to Chicken. 
(2) For each stable equilibrium in Chicken, there exist stable equilibria 
to No Fear, No Greed , and Control ,  respectively such that the 
equilibrium levels of contribution are less in Chicken than in either 
No Greed or No Fear , which are in turn less than in Control. 
The above points are illustrated in Figure 3, where we have graphed 
equations (S) for one of the Simmons et. al. (1983) experimental conditions , 
namely w-3, N-7, c - 0, S. This figure S:i.ows how the Chicken curve lies above 
the others while No Fear and No Greed both lie above Control. Observe, 
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however, that No Greed and No Fear are anbiguously ordered. The same pattern 
is repeated in Figure 4, which represents the same conditions but with w-S. 
For the function 1-F(d) in Figure 4, each incentive structure has a unique 
equilibrium. The equilibria satisfy the partial order represented by the 
proposition. But for the function 1-G(d) in Figure 4, both Chicken and No 
Greed have three equilibria, the ociter two being stable. In this case one of 
the stable equilibria for No Greed has a lower participation probability than 
one of the stable equilibria to Chicken. 
Changing the Game Parameters 
We examine the following comparative statics: 
1. The effect of increasing the cost of contributing (c) on the equilibrium 
contribution rate (q* - 1-F(d*)), and the cutoff point (d*). 
2. The effect of increasing the degree of altruism of the players [a 
rightward shift of the distribution function F(·)] on q* and d*. We index 
distributions by a parameter a such that, for all d ,  8F(d)/8a � 0. 
3. The effect of increasing the number of individuals in the game (N) on q* 
and d*. 
4. The effects of increasing the threshold level (w) on q* and d*. 
Table 2 about here 
We analyze these for each incentive structure. The details are worked out 
in the Appendix. A summary is contained in Table 2. It may be useful to 
refer to Figures 3 and 4 in order to visualize the intuition for the different 
results. Most of our comparative static results for stable equilibria are 
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intuitive and straightforward. The result that contributinn rates are 
increasing in altruism and decreasing in the cost of contribution for all 
mechanisms considered is fairly obvious. The interpretation of the effects of 
changing w and N are a bit more complicated. The proper intuition is provided 
by considering Chicken. An increase in w changes the proportion of 
contributions required for provision of the public g:iod. This induces a 
rightward shift in the equilibrium curve, reflecting the fact that a larger 
proportion of the population DUst contribute in order for the public good to 
be provided. If the equilibrium expected number of contributors excluding 
V'�l(Cfb +� 
one individual was less than w-1 (i. e. , q* < ;��) then this chang'J.probability 
that any individual would be pivotal since the probability an individual is 
w-1 · pivotal is maximized at q - N-l > q*. If this individual had been a marginal 
contributor (di - d* + e) he will no longer contribute. This effectively 
increases d*, The process continues until a new equilibrium point is reached. 
The stability condition guarantees that this adjustment process converges 
locally. If q* is greater than w-1 N-1' a similar argument shows that the 
probability that someone will be a marginal contributor increases in w. 
An increase in N has an opposite effect to an increase in w -- that is, it 
decreases the proportion of contributors required for the provision of the 
public good. This induces a leftward shift in the equilibrium curve, 
resulting in comparative statics exactly opposite to the effect of w. 
The effect of increasing a on the cutpoint is similar to that of 
increasing N. A rightward shift in the distribution curve has the same effect 
as a leftward shift in the equilibrium curve. However, even when an increase 
in a causes the cutpoint to increase, the increase rever completely offsets 
the distribution shift, so the contribution rate always increases. 
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A Special Case: w-1 
Comparative statics analysis is straightforward in the special case (w-1) 
where only a single contributor is required. This case has also been explored 
in a different context by Samuelson (1984). Chicken and No Fear are identical 
in this case as are No Greed and Control. The expected utility conditions 
become: 
d* - c - (1-q*)N-l (Sa' ) 
(Chicken, No Fear) 
d* - (c-1)(1-q*)N-l (Sc' ) 
(No Greed, Control) 
These equations show that d* is monotonically increasing in q* when w-1. 
Consquently, the symmetric equilibrium is always unique and the comparative 
statics are those given by the first column in Table 2. Thus, the w.-1 case 
would provide a setting for some strong experimental tests of the theory. 
However, the available experimental data all have w>l.
s. Analysis of Experimental Data 
We now proceed to apply our analysis to the experimental data. The data 
we use and a detailed description of experimental procedures are presented in 
Simmons, et. al. (1983), Dawes, et. al. (198S) and Van de Kragt et al. (1.986). 
They followed standard procedures, which included testing for subject 
comprehension of the task and understanding of the monetary payoff rules. 
Such testing was important since naive subjects were used, 
The following two relevant initial observations can be made by inspecting 
Figures 3 and 4: 
1. In Figure 4, the curve labelled 1-F(d) represents one possible 
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distribution of d. For this distribution, No Greed would have the highest 
level of contribution and No Fear would have a level slightly greater than 
Chicken, as observed in the experiments, In contrast, the curve labelled 
1-G(d) produces multiple equilibria for Chicken and No Greed and a single , 
stable equilibrium for No Fear. fureover , of the two stable equilibria for 
No Greed, one would have a participation rate barely greater than that of No 
Fear while the other would have a participation rate near zero, Thus, in 
contrast to the assertion by Simmons, et. al. (1983) that removing greed has 
more effect on stimulating contribution than does removing fear in general , we 
would argue that contribution will depend upon both the subjective 
distribution of altruism held by the subjects and the incentive structure, 
Even making a relatively small change in a single parameter (compare F igures 3 
and 4) can make a large difference in contribution rates for a fixed 
distribution, 
2. The No Greed and No F ear curves intersect at d - 0. As a result, the 
experimental observation of substantially greater contribution rates for No 
Greed than No F ear indicates that the No Greed equilibrium must occur for a 
negative value of d *, This is suggestive of some degree of malevolent 
behavior in the experimental population. 
For the remaining analysis, we assume that when multiple equilibria exist, 
the same one will occur in every experimental replication. While this is a 
strong assumption, it might be IIDtivated by efficiency arguments or by 
appealing to cultural norms leading to a Schelling-point type of solution to 
the tacit coordination problem. Unlike, say, the ( = J permutations of a 
w-contributor equilibrium in a game of complete information, one out of 
several d* equilibria values may well be prominent. And, in the many 
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situations where there is a unique equilibrium, the assumption is ,irrelevant. 
Given this assumption together with the assumptions made in Section 3, we 
can make a stronger prediction about the ordering of experimental results than 
is possible under the complete information model: 
The Inverse Monotonicity Hypothesis (IMH). If q* is measured 
experimentally and equation (4) is then solved for £<, conditional on the 
experimental value of N, w, c, and the game variant, then q* and d* will have 
a strictly inverse monotonic relationship. 
Note that IMH is an extremely useful hypothesis for empirical purposes , 
since it can be tested by �ombining data from a very wide range of 
experimental situations. The key testing problem, of course , is that q * 
cannot be measured directly. 
in experimental settings12. 
But there is an obvious natural estimator of q* 
This is simply the proportion of observed 
contributors in a set of experiments employing the same game variant. 
As a test of IMH consider the data summarized in Table 3. These represent 
ten experimental environments . The parameters w md N and the incentive 
structures vary across these environments. Each experimental subject 
participated in only one game. We consider only games with no pre- play 
communication among participants, Participants learn their payoff but are 
never told either how many individuals contributed (except implicitly in 
Incremental) or which specific individuals contributed. 
The data from Table 3 are displayed graphically in F igure 5 and illustrate 
a clear negative relationship between q* and d* as predicted by IMH. There 
are a variety of statistical tests available to formally quantify the degree 
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to which the data in Table 3 support IMH. Since IMH is an ordinal hypothesis , 
ordinal mesures of association are appropriate. One such measure is 
Spearman's rank order correlation which for our data is simply the correlation 
between the rank orders of qi< and d* in Table 3. The Spearman correlation is 
-0. 88 (N-10). A one-tailed t-test rejects the hypothesis that the correlation 
is 0 at a significance level better than 0. 001. Alternative ordinal rreasures 
of association (Hildebrand et al. , 1977) also produce highly significant 
values. Finally, using a cardinal measure, the raw correlation between d* and 
q* is -0. 85, which is also significantly less than 0 at better than the 0. 001 
level. 
Since our hypothesis seems to be well supported, visual inspection of 
Figure 5 readily provides some rough estimates of the degree of altruism in 
the experimental population. Many individuals appear to have a relatively 
high sense of altruism. The median individual [F(d*) - 0. 5] seems to have 
been willing to give up about $3. 50 of a $5. 00 endowment for the value of 
serving as a contributor. However, there is substantial variance in altruism. 
Indeed, the fact that there is less than unanimous contribution for the three 
experiments with d* near zero suggests there are significant numbers of 
malevolent individuals. 
In addition to the study of IMH, Table 2 and Figure 5 can be used to 
examine one conclusion from our comparative statics analysis. 'Ihe usual 
intuition is that with w and c fixed, percentage contribution declines with 
group size . 1 3  However, our comparative statics imply that size 
effects should depend on the relative magnitudes of q* and 
group 
w-1 
N-1 ' Consider, 
w-1 .!!..9.* the w-N Chicken game. Since N-l - 1, aN � 0 for!!!!}'. distribution F(·). This 
may explain why we observed slightly more participation in the 5 of 7 game 
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than in 5 of 5. However, since the comparative statics pertain only to 
local values of derivatives, neither the higher rate in the 5 of 7 games nor 
the lower participation rate in the 5 of 9 gflmes provide a conclusive test of 
the comparative statics. 
6. Extensions and Conclusions 
In this section we discuss two potentially useful directions for 
generalizing the model we have developed here. The first has to do with 
applying the basic methodology of sections 2-4 to "variable contributions " 
public goods problems. The second relates tD our choice of row to model the 
unobserved preferences, 
A. Variable Contribution Games. 
In the games we analyzed, participants had to make a binary choice. In 
many other public good situations, it is natural to model an individual's 
choice as a variable level of contribution and model the total public good 
level as a continuous increasing function of total contribution, rather than 
as a binary outcome based on a threshold. 
Consider the following extensions of the binary game, where we will denote 
the level of i's contribution by Xi, the total production of the public good 
N 
by X - L___ Xi, the (constant) cost per unit of contribution by c, and the 
i-1 
value to individual i of the total amount of public good by a concave function 
Vi(X). Assuming separability, as before, we write 
U(X, Xi) - V(X) - cxi + Di(Xi) 
where D(xi) is the additional (altruistic) benefit i gets from contributing Xi 
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units of the public good. If we make an assumption that i contributes only in 
discrete units, the problem simplifies considerably. i Let dj be the marginal 
altruistic benefit to i of contributing a unit , given that i is already 
xi 
contributing j-1 units so Di(Xi) - l.__ df. Suppose we assume a similar 
j-1 
information structure i as before, i. e. , each i knows dj Vj, but only knows the 
distribution function (Fjl according to which the others' d� were (identically 
and independently) drawn. We conjecture that a Bayesian equilibrium to this 
"continuous" contribution game is a simple generalization of the d*-equilibria 
of the binary game. It is a set 
' 
* * of cutoff points (d1, . . . elk• . . . ), one 
for each contribution level, which define the following decision rule: 
Each individual i contributes j1 units where 
A reason for p.irsuing this direction is that there are frequent naturally 
occurring public goods problems of this sort, and these problems have led many 
experimentalists to use exactly this structure of payoffs (of the distribution 
of the di 's are still not controlled in the laboratory environment). We have j 
in mind here particularly the experiments conducted by Marwell and Ames (1979, 
1980, 1981), Kim and Walker (1984), Isaac, Mccue and Plott (1982), and Isaac , 
Walker and Thomas (1984). 
These experiments differed from the binary contribution games of Dawes et. 
al. (1985) and Simmons et al. (1983) in several important ways. First , as we 
just noted, the payoff structure was rot binary, but allowed variable levels 
of contribution and public good. Second, the incentive structure was a 
generalized version of the prisoner's dilemma rather than the chicken ---? -f \t.t $� 
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game. That is, if it were common knowledge that d� 
J 
= 0 for all i and 
j ,  and the experiment was not "repeated", then everyone would have a 
dominant strategy of not contributing anything (i. e. , V (x) < c for all levels 
of x). Third, the game was repeated for several trials with the same group 
and the outcomes were publicly announced after each trial. This latter 
feature introduces many interesting features not present in a static setting -
such as learning and the possibility of adjusting one's decisions in response 
to other players' contribution choices. These features may be expected to 
induce systematic changes from trial to trial of the equilibrium (dj ) vector , 
which should lead to a systematic pattern in the 
contribution levels over time. 
B. Alternative models of privately known preferences. 
evolution of these 
We assumed that the nature of each individual's privately known component 
of preferences was his degree of altruism, which was assumed to be independent 
of the level of contribution by others. There are many alternative ways to 
introduce heterogeneity in preferences, each of which may explain variations 
in the experimental data with varying degrees of success. We chose a model of 
"pure altruism" because of the preponderance of casual evidence from 
experiments that many subjects contributed when this was clearly against their 
best interests in the absence of altruism. Our model of altruism was the 
simplest one we could think of and was therefore a natural first step. Other 
possibilities are discussed briefly below: 
1. Simple Conditional Altruism. This relaxes the strong assumption that 
one's CMil altruistic benefit is independent of the level of contribution of 
others. For example, in the binary contribution game, suppose that d - 0 if 
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less than w-1 other individuals contribute, otherwise it is eKactly "*iat we 
defined it to be in section 3. That is , you get no altruistic benefit from 
contributing unless the public good is produced when you contribute. One can 
easily derive the equilibrium conditions. The right hand side of these new 
equalities equal the right hand side of the corresponding equalities in (5) 
divided by the probability that at least w-1 other individuals contribute. 
(PN+ in the Appendix. ) w-1 
It is then straightforward to show this "conditioning" leads to a higher 
d* in equilibrium and thus lower contribution levels. This is not surprising, 
since, assuming F( · ) is the same in both cases, conditional altruism is "less 
altruistic" than unconditional altruism. 
2. General Conditional Altruism. One could let di be a general (not 
necessarily increasing) function of the number of other contributors. We have 
not investigated this because the number of other contributors was typically 
not revealed to experimental subjects. 
3. Altruism based on other's public goods benefits instead of the "act" 
of contributing. We assumed that altruistic benefit was derived from the act 
of contributing. An interesting alternative model, which is similar in spirit 
to general conditional altruism, is one in "*iich altruistic benefits are a 
function of the total benefits one confers on the rest of the group as a 
result of making a contribution. 
4. Non-altruistic models of privately known von Neumann-Morgenstern 
utilities. An implicit assumption we have made is that the dollar payoffs to 
individuals correspond eKactly (or at least in an increasing linear way) to 
the non-altruistic c omponent of utility payoffs. If this is not the case, 
either because of different degrees of risk aversion or varying "intensities" 
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of preferences which are privately known to the players, then a slightly 
different version of Bayesian game approach is appealing. These non-altruistic 
uncertainty models are formally quite similar to the altruistic models in that 
they include privately known parameters in the payoff matrix. However, they 
differ in one very important way - namely, they assume that the ordinal 
preferences induced by the experimenter are preserved. There is a growing 
body of experimental data "*iich indicates that for many individuals in these 
experiments, ordinali ty is not successful induced. The 11Dst persistent 
observation of this sort is that a substantial percentage (roughly 25%) of 
individuals contribute when non-contribution is a strictly dominant strategy 
in terms of monetary payoffs .1 4 This type of behavior is consistent with 
either a conditional or an unconditional specification of altruism. It is not 
consistent with a model in "*iich the only source of private information is 
risk aversion. 
In summary, we have pursued two objectives in this paper. First, we have 
analyzed a theoretical model of voluntary contributions in binary choice 
discrete public goods environments, based on asymetric information. The 
motivation for this BI!alysis comes both from common real-world situations and 
from an expanding body of systematic experimental results. Consequently, our 
second purpose was to confront the conclusions of ocir theory with the 
experimental data, focusing en one of several implications of the theory, the 
Inverse Monotonicity Hypothesis. Although the data were broadly consistent 
with the hypothesis, it would be difficult to argue definitive empirical 
claims, since the data set we BI!alyzed is quite small BI!d restricted to very 
little parametric variation. 
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Appendix 
In developing the comparative statics, the following notation will be 
used: 
N­pk (q) 
N-1 - N - L Pj (q)
j-k 
Except for changes in a, we obtain comparative statics for ct* only. With 
this one exception, the comparative statics of q* always have the opposite 
sign. We omit analysis of Control; analysis of that case is straightforward 
given our treatment of Chicken. 
Chicken 
1. 
Differentiating (Sa) gives 
aPN 
where 
w-1 w-1 - (N-l)q PN (q) -aq-- - q (l-q) w-1 
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ad* * w-1 Therefore, -ac > 0 if (a) q � �l 
* w-1 * or if (b) q < N-l and f (d ) < 
1 
Condition (b) essentially says that we are guaranteed the intuitive 
ad* result a;- > 0 in the case of equilibria that are by the Cournot 
adjustment procedure and other related criteria. 
An example of an unstable equilibrium "'*1.ere the last inequality is 
violated is illustrated by the point labeled U in Figure 4. Graphically, such 
equilibria mly occur when the graph of the equation q - 1 - F(d) cuts the 
graph of equation (S) from below. 
No Fear, No Greed, Control 
act* By similar argument, a;- > 0 at all stable equilibria. 
2. ad
* � 
a;- ' aa 
Chicken 
Again differentiating (Sa) gives 
aF < O ad* O if * > w-1 Since aa , &;""" > q _ N-l 
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* w-1 * If q < N-l and f (d ) < 
1 
8PN w-1 
-aq--
(i. e. ' the equilibrium ad
* 
is stable) , then a;- < o. Therefore, for stable
ad* equilibria, the sign of a;- switches at q* - w-l N-1 It is easily established
� that aa > 0 at all stable equilibria. 
No Fear 
Differentiating (Sb) gives 
aF [ aPN w-1 
ad* _ aa 8cJ 
aa 
1 - f(d*) 
apN
+ ]
w 1 ad* c � < 0 then a;-> O. 
apN+ 
] 
w-1 - c-aq 
[aPN apN+ ] w-1 w-1 - - c -aq aq 
[aPN aPN+ ]
If --1!:..! - c --1!:..! > 0 aq aq 
then ad
* a;- < 0 if and only if d* is a stable equilibrium. Ref erring to
aPN apN
+ 
Figure 1, w-1 w-1 is negative if and only if q* > q NF (defined inaq - c aq 
Figure 1). One can show that this will generally be the case either if 
* > w-1 q N-1 or if d* > o. However, these latter two are only sufficient
conditions. As in Chicken, � o  aa > at all stable equilibria. 
No Greed 
The analysis is parallel to No Fear. 
[aPN aPN- ]
If ___!!:l - c ___!!:l < 0 aq aq 
ad* then a;-> 0. 
[aPN apN- ]
If ___!!:l - c ___!!:l > 0 th ad
* 
< 0 if and only if d* is a aq aq en a;-
2S 
aPN 
stable equilibrium. w
-1 Referring to Figure 3 ,  ----aq- - c 
aPN­w-1 
aq is positive if
and only if (defined in Figure 3). One can show that this will 
* w-1 * generally be the case if either q < N-l or if d > 0. 
* 
Also , � > 0 at all aa 
stable equilibria. 
3.
Chicken: Differentiation of (Sa) and rearranging yields: 
aPN 
1-f(d*) w-l aq 
We will treat N as a discrete variable, and evaluate the 
N -aPw-1 � by the first difference between N-1 and N: 
< 0 
N 
iff w-1 q > N-1 
derivative 
aPw-1 w-1 As derived earlier, aq < 0 iff q > N-l 
w-1 Therefore , when q > N-l , both
ad* ad* the numerator and the denominator of aN are positive, so aN > 0 as long as
* > w-1 q N-1 
w-1 ad* If q* < N-l , then aN < 0 when d* is a stable equilibrium. This
parallels the results for ad* 
aa . We add the caveat that if q* is close to
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w-1 ad* 
N-l this comparative static may be inaccurate (although aa will be close to
ad* 0 in that case anyway), since our evaluation of aN 
mixes a non-local change 
in one variable (N) and a local change in another variable (q). This applies 
to the analysis below, as well. 
ad* To sign aw , we follow a similar line of argument. Differentiation of
(Sb) yields: 
ad* 
aw 
N -aPw-1
aN 
N aPw-1 1 - f(d*) aq
N aPw-1 
We treat w as a discrete variable and evaluate � using the first
difference between w-1 and w: 
PN 1 - PwN-2 - PwN-1 [ 1 - (w-1)(1-q)] w- (N-w-l)q 
> 0 w-1 iff q > N 
w-1 w-1 Therefore, when q* > N-l and hence * > w-l) ad* < o q N ' aw ' If q* < N and the 
ad* equilibrium is stable then aw > o. 
No Fear: Differentiation of (Sb) gives 
apN
+ 
w-1 aP
N 
w-1 
ad* c 8N - 8NaN"" -
[ aP
N+ 
l+f(d*) c ;�1 
aPN
+ 
aPN+ w-1 w-1 It is easily shown that 8N > 0 and -aq-- > 0.
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aPN 
]
w-1 
- aq-
ad* Therefore, aN"" > 0 
* w-1 if q > N-1 * 
w-1 If q < N-l the sign is ambiguous. 
We also have: 
ad* aw -
aPN 
First recall that ;�l � O iff q* � W�l 
N 
W aPw-1-c p - --w-1 aw 
If q* > w-1 h h N-l , t en t e numerator
ad* is negative and the denominator is positive, so aw <  0. * w-1 If q < N-l the 
sign is ambiguous. 
No Greed. 
Using similar arguments to the No Fear case, one can show that if 
* w-1 ad* ad* q < N-l then aN"" < 0 and a;-> 0, Otherwise the signs are ambiguous.
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FOOTNOTES 
These include (1) social-psychological explanations based on concepts such 
as fear and greed [Simmons et. al. (1983) J ; (2) the minimum contributing 
set [van de Kragt et. al. (1983)]; (3) pure strategy Nash equilibrium 
[Palfrey and Rosenthal (1984) and Calvert and Wilson (1984)]; and (5) 
mixed strategy Nash equilibrium [Palfrey and Rosenthal (1984)]. More 
recently , Rappaport (1985) has proposed an expected utility decision 
theoretic model. Our approach differs significantly from his in that we 
model the social dilemma as a game of incomplete information about 
altruism and close the model by imposing the consistency requirements of 
Bayesian Nash equilibria. 
Relevant papers for our purposes include Darley and Latan� (1968), Dawes 
et. al. (in press , 1985) , Isaac et. al. (1984), Isaac et, al. (1982), Kim 
and Walker (1984) , Marwell and Ames (1979 ,  1980,  1981), Simmons et. al. 
(1983) , and Van de Kragt et. al. (1983). 
This observation has been made by Cox et, al, (1982) with regard to 
auction experiments. 1hey also attempt to explain observations by 
explicitly incorporating unobservable (or 
preferences into a theoretical model, 
at least uncontrolled) 
Lipnowski and Maital (1983) suggest that this bimatrix structure can also 
be used to analyze aspects of games with continuous contributions to the 
production of a continuous public good output. 
This includes work by both psychologists and economists and is far too 
extensive to summarize here, See, for example, the collection of papers 
in Kahneman, Slavic and Tversky (1982). 
6 In what follows, we will usually be assuming that F is twice continuously 
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differentiable and F ' > 0 over a closed interval [�,d] where � < -1 and 
a> i. 
Since c < 1 ,  malevolents have negative a1truism levels. 
The results contained in Palfrey and Rosenthal (1984 , 1985) can be easily 
extended to provide rigorous development of the existence of equilibrium 
and of asymptotic properties for the games analyzed in this paper. 
Bliss and Nalebuff (1985) treat the threshold game with -i. However, 
unlike our setup where all players must move simultaneously , in their 
model players choose a delay time , contributing only if ro other player 
has contributed by this time, In both their game and ours, players' 
strategies depend on a single private cost parameter (i. e. d i in our 
game), Their game avoids the inefficiency of over contribution but 
generates inefficiency in the form of delay costs, Extending their game 
to w>l would constitute one of many interesting avenues for the analysis 
of dynamic threshold games, 
For example, in 1984 Metropolitan Life offered to absorb the (solvent) 
life insurance subsidiaries of the bankrupt Charter group if individual 
holders agreed to convert at least 25 percent of the total value of 
Charter tax shelter annuities to Metropolitan annuities that paid a lower 
rate of interest. See Letter from Metropolitan Life Insurance Company to 
Charter Security Life policyholders, December 1 ,  1984, 
April 29 , 1985 ,  p. 61. 
See Hansen et, al. (1986) for use of a similar approach in estimating the 
distribution of voting costs using aggregate election data. 
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13 See Darley and Latan� (1968) who found support for this group size 
hypothesis with -1 and N-1, 3, and 5 in an experiment with unstructured 
payoffs, rut "*1.ich nonetheless could be viewed as a binary contribution 
Chicken game. 
14 This occurs on the (publicly known) last trial of multi-game experiments 
[Isaac, Walker, and Thomas (1984)] and in single shot experiments both 
with and without visual contact between contributors and beneficiaries Van 
de Kragt et al. (1986)]. Isaac, Walker, and Thomas (1984, p. 141)
conclude, "We conjecture .. . [there are] a core of people for whom utility 
functions are not completely selfish or "*1.o otherwise wish tD behave in 
'good guy' fashion. " 
The pattern of contribution observed in these experiments is also 
instructive. First, "*1.en participants can choose among several levels of 
contribution, a full range of levels is observed, even in the last round. 
Second, the amount of contribution can be manipulated by varying the 
benefit of defection relative to the marginal value of contribution. 
These observations suggest that there is considerable variation in the 
degree of selfishness in the subject pools and that individuals trade off 
their personal benefits against the social value of cooperation. 
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Table 1. 
Payoff F\Jnctions for Selected Contribution Games 
Contributors Non-Contributors 
v(mi, l) v (mi,O) 
Game 
Description mi>w-1 mi-w-1 mi<w-1 mi>w-1 m1-w-l mi<w-1 
Chicken 1-c 1-c -c 1 0 0 
No Fear 1-c 1-c 0 1 0 0 
No Greed 1-c 1-c -c 1-c 0 0 
Control 1-c 1-c 0 1-c 0 0 
Poison 1-c 1-c 1-c 1 0 0 
Dominant 1-c -c -c 1 0 0 
Incremental bmi-c bmi-.c bmi-c bmi bmi bmi 
Note: Relative to the experimental games, we have, for expositional 
convenience, renormalized payoffs so that "Table Entries - 0. lxDollar Payoffs 
0. 5. " In all experiments analyzed except Incremental, c-0. 5. In 
Incremental, c-0.6 and �0. 2. The games other than Incremental are 
"threshold" games where w denotes the threshold of contributions needed to 
produce the "public" good. In the experimental runs of Chicken, No Fear, and 
No Greed, groups of size N-5, 7, or 9 were used with """'3 or 5. 
the effective value of N was 5 and w was set to 4. 
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In Dominant, 
Table 2. 
Comparative Statics of Stahle Equilibria to Threshold Games 
Chicken, 
Parameter Control 
q* 
ad* Results are for -a;-
No 
Fear 
q* 
No 
Greed 
q* 
w-1 
<N-1 
w-1 w-1 w-1 w-1
<N-1 
w-1 
::N-1 
c, cost 
of contrib. 
a, altruism 
distribution 
N, group 
size 
w, 
threshold 
::N-1 
+ + 
+ 
+ 
+ 
<N-1 ::N-1 
+ + + 
+ 
? + 
? + 
Notes: Some refinement of results in ? ranges is in the Appendix. 
a n* Results for a.:;- have sign opposite to that in table 
except that � is always positive. 
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? 
? 
? 
Table 3 
Analysis of Daves-Orbell-SiDmons-Van de Kragt 
No Discussion Experiments 
Number of Total Es timate 
Experiment Contributors Subjects of q* d
* Values 
Chicken 3 of 7 36 7 0  0. 514 0.279 
No Fear 3 of 7 30 49 0. 612 0. 355 
No Greed 3 of 7 60 70 0.857 -0.002 
Chicken 5 of 7 45 70 0.643 0.173 
No Fear 5 of 7 32 49 0. 653 -0. 002 
No Greed 5 of 7 65 70 0. 929 -0. 025 
Chicken 5 of 9 42 90 0.467 0.231 
Chicken 5 of 5 16 25 0.640 0.332 
Dominated 4 of 9 19 63 0.302 0. 500 
Incremental 21 56 0. 375 0. 600 
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